JPRS-UWE-88-007 17 JUNE 1988

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Soviet Union

WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No 3, March 1988

Soviet Union WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS No 3, March 1988

JIPRS-UWE-88-007 CONTENTS 17 JUNE 1988

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following is a translation of the published in Moscow monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDU- ARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in by the Institute of World Economy and International

Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated] English Summary of Major Articles /pp /58-/59)/ ............ PR Ae | ‘Creative’ Soviet Strategy Disturbing U.S. Establishment /L. Lywhimmoy; pp 3-14) oooocccccccccccccccecceeeseeseeerevnns 2 Action Program for Foreign Trade Lacking /L. Zewim; pp 41-S1f oooccccccccccccccccsceveeveeseennnenenneensnnnenensnenenencenvens 10 Near East Prospects Improved by Better Soviet-U.S. Relations /Ye. Dmitrivev; pp S261) ooc...cccc0000000 17 Interviews with Leftist French Politicians /Henri Krasuci, Lionel Jospin: pp 62-71] ......cccccccccceereereereevem 25 Arucles in MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, RE ES a ee 26

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WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

of Major Articles 18160007a Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 88 (signed to press 15 Feb 88) pp 158-159

[Text] “New Thinking and Soviet-American Relations” by L. Lyubimov. Soviet-American relations have since 1917 covered a difficult path. Their experience is in many respects instructive. It .dicates that a stable and positive nature of Soviet-American relations largely depends on the basic principles of the two sides in conducting affairs in a way that would reduce the mili- tary danger, normalize relations in all spheres and on respecting each other's interests, on a striving to guaran- tee them by mutually acceptable decisions. The author states that the history of Soviet-American relations has accumulated an invaluable experience which makes it possible to comprehend thoroughly our long-standing foreign political dilemma—unity or artificial confronta- tion, figuratively speaking the philosophy of the Decree of Peace and of the Brest peace treaty philosophy. The article emphasizes the significance of the 1930s in the history of Soviet-American relations which paved the way for the cooperation of the two countries in WWII. The reasons for a drastic deterioration of Soviet-Amer- ican relations are revealec. They engendered the “cold war” epoch which stimulated both nuclear and conven- tional arms production and conduced to the squandering by the two countries of boundless resources. The author analyses the causes which prevented the two countries from considerably reducing tension and building stable relations. Thus the violation correct interconnection between the above mentioned philosophies has contrib- uted both to the waning of the detente and to the new confrontation with corresponding losses. Soviet-Amer- ican relations are entering a new stage. The unity of the aims and practice of foreign policy demonstrated by VI. Lenin during the first years of the Great October Social- ist Revolution is today the most important feature of the foreign policy component of perestroyka. This is very important for the development of Soviet-American rela- tions.

“Revolutionary Theory and Our Time” by G. Dili- gensky. The author believes that the elaboration of the theory of transition from capitalisra to socialism signif- icantly lags behind the changes in the objective situation both in the world at large and in its certain regions. Realism in theory and practice—this is one of the topical demands of the revolutionary forces. But the deep- rooted primitive stereotypes hinder the realistic vision of the world. The revolutionary law-governed transforma- tions are quite often automatically inferred not so much from a present-day analysis of the situation as from the experience of past revolutions. Such experience is only to a limited degree correlated with the concrete historical circumstances. The author considering the existing situ- ation in the developed capitalist world arrives at the

conclusion that the problem of the subject of the revo- lutonary process demands a new comprehension. Today it 1s ever more difficult to form the political opposition to the monopolistic oligarchy only on the traditional “class” principle, that is to say on the basis of an alliance of different socio-economic and class groups. Firstly great significance in forming such an opposition is attached to combining class, group and human interests. Secondly: in the alignment of social forces in capitalist society of great importance alongside with objective socio-economic factors are cultural and psychological ones. The character ~f the needs and values of the masses should also be regarded. Of no less importance is a comprehension of the revolutionary movement's aims. In the past these aims were more or less obvious, axiomatic. Under present conditions the perspectives of revolution are shifting to another plane. Of decisive importance is the question “What sort of socialism?” That is why the struggle for social progress in the non-socialist world 1s correlated with the revolutionary renewal of socialism, its democratization. It is in the course of this process that the problem of the concrete content of the present-day social ideal, the perspectives and aims of the revolutionary struggle are practically being solved.

The characteristic feature of capitalist economic devel- opment in the 1980s is the growing human factor's role in production and technological innovation. It 1s closely connected with the spreading up of scientific and tech- nological progress and transit‘on to a new type of “economic™ growth innovative type. M. Grachev in his article “Management of Labour Under New Conditions of Economic Growth” traces the logic of capitalist man- agement in connection with technological evolution, growth of labor productivity and the change in the forms of cooperation. The author shows that certain furms of management of labor correspond to different types of economic growth. Under the conditions of “industrial” type of growth technocratic management taylorism and fordism prevailed. Today traditional forms of manage- ment are loosing their efficiency. Companies are orien- tated to high technologies, flexible manufacturing, adap- tive marketing strategies, creative solutions in production of goods and services, a transfer to innova- tive mechanisms of management of labor. Their atten- tion is centered on the interaction of workers, develop- ment of group forms of labor, creativity of the staff, integration of its efforts. The author considers some main reasons for the transfer to new management and singles out important forms and methods used by corpo- rations in the USA, Japan and Western Europe: “quality circles” and autonomous work groups, suggestion sys- tems and communications in new products develop- ment, rotation of personnel, human resources develop- ment and the establishing of the firm “organizational culture.” In conclusion the author reveals the innovative management contradictions anc evaluates its perspec- tives.

L. Zevin in his article “Certain Problems of Economic Cooperation of the USSR and Developing Countries”

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indicates that the rapid growth trade, economic and technical cooperation of the USSR and other socialist States with the developing countries in the post-war period had marked the appearance 'n the world economy of a new type of international relations of states with a different level of deveiopment. These relations contrib- ute to overcoming by the former colonies and semi- colonies the backwardness, to spreading up their edvance along the path of socio-economic progress and to the : rengthening of their political and economic independence. Mutual incentives stipulated high rates of growth of trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation of the USSR with this group of countries. But in the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s this cooperation has begun to lose its former dynamism and since the mid of the current decade the volume of mutual trade has reduced. The author poses a number of ques- tions. What are the reasons for the emergence of negative phenomena in this sphere of relations between the USSR and the developing countries? What ways and means should be sought for solving the accumulated problems in the context of the new world economic situation and the radical reform of the Soviet economic mechanism? The author believes that one of the main reasons for a certain instability for the slowing down of economic growth and since the mid 1980s of its absolute reduction lies in the fact that the USSR hasn't so far worked out long-term concept of development of trade, economic and scientific-technological relations with the develop- ing countries which would result in a scientifically, well founded program of concrete actions.

E. Dmitriev in his article “The Middle East Interna- tional Conference (Lights and Darks) believes that the unsettled Arab-Izraeli conflict is the initial cause for all the troubles in the region. Only a settlement, based on the observance of justice for everybody can bring peace to the Middle East. The author compares the Soviet and American approaches to the problem ot the Middle East settlement and discusses the importance of the Soviet proposal on convening a peaceful conference. He ana- lyzes the reasons for the failure of the Geneva 1973 conference and believes that since the trust of public opirion on the ability of the specially convened interna- tional forum to bring the long-awaited peace was shaken, it is necessary to create proper conditions under which the conference would be able to fulfill its task of an exceptional importance. The article considers Israeli and the USA's approaches to the peace conference. It pays special attention to different versions of Palestinian representation at it. The article also focuses on state- ments and actions of the part of American and Israeli administrations, on their attempts to isolate the USSR from the settlement process. Only a joint stand of all Arab countries on the whole range of problems can be conducive to the success of the conference. To find real and effective ways for the settlement of the existing Situation would essentially bring closer guaranteed peace, based on justice for all parties concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict the most protracted and tangled in the post-war history.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo Tsk KPSS “Pravda” “Mirovaya ekonomika 1 mexhdunarodnyye otnoshe- nya”, 1988

8550

‘Creative’ Soviet Strategy Disturbing U.S. Establishment

18160007b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA ir Russian No 3, Mar 88 (signed to press 15 Feb 88) pp 3-14

{Article by L. Lyubimov: “New Thinking and Soviet- American Relations”)

[Text] The stable, positive nature of Soviet-American relations will depend to a decisive extent both on the fundamental intentions of the two sides to move in the direction of a lessening of the general military danger and a normalization of their relations in all areas and on a realistic consideration of ene another's interests and the endeavor to see a guarantee 0) their interests in the finding of mutually acceptable solutions. The restoration of the unity of aims and practice of Soviet foreign policy— unity for which V.1. Lenin was struggling in the very first veors following the October revolution—today represents @ nost important feature of the foreign policy component of perestroyka. The well-known American studies scholar Lev Lvovich Lyubimov gives his viewpoint on the nast, present and future of Soviet-American relations.

The USSR and the United States are the mightiest powers of the two sociopolitical systems embodying the unity and struggle of opposites of the modern world and the central knot of contradictions of its dialectical devel- opment. Soviet-American relations have trodden a sig- nificant path, the results o* which it would be appropri- ate to sum up in connection with the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the coming 55th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The formation of the new social system began in Russia with th. Decree on Peace, the granting of independence to Finland and Poland and the renunciation of imperial and colonial ambitions and claims and the advancement of the idea of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In the same period, on the other hand, U.S. imperialism was taking the first actual steps en route to securing world leadership. For the two leading states of the world a new frame of reference of their policy and role in the fate of 20th century mankind had begun.

The history of Soviet-American relations contains truly invaluable experience, an examination of which makes ii possible to comprehend a long-standing dilemma of Soviet :oreign policy—the concurrence or artificial con- trasting of, conditionally speaking, the philos »phy of the Decree on Peace and the philosophy of the Brest peace.

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The Decree on Peace contained for many decades ahead the fundamental air. of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and declared our long-term intentions and main foreign policy principles. And the Brest peace was pre- cisely an example of the practical implementation of these principles in a specific, extraordinarily difficult situation and testimony to the unity of word and deed. In his speech at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets V.I. Lenin declared a readiness to discuss any practical proposals concerning an immediate end to the war. The bitter struggle in connection with the conclusion of the Brest peace showed how difficult it is to realize this unity in practice and how complex is the above-mentioned dilemma.

It is wrong in principle to discern in the actual situation of the conclusion of the Brest peace only the most compiex signs of that time—economic devastation and the absence of an efficient army and, as a result, a difficult compromise. Features of permanent signifi- cance show through in the concept of the Brest peace particularly clearly today: a renunciation of empty phrases concerning peace in general not buttressed by actual deeds, the surmounting of paralyzing, self-de- stroying complacency ensuing from an absolutization of one’s own rightness, renunciation of some “missionary spirit” on a state scale, a resolute search for a basis for cooperation in the name of peace and, finally, the understanding that peace was a most important condi- tion of the building of socialism. Brest ensured the survival of the Soviet republic in the most critical period of its existence. Lenin's policy on this issue was an undoubted expression of the new political thinking which had been demonstrated by the Bolsheviks as of the first months of the revolution.

Russia’s economic position in 1917 was catastrophic. That the country was “in a haze” was confirmed by the vast devastation, the tremendous scale of physical destruction of industrial means of production, the com- plete collapse of the financial system, the undermining of agriculture, the almost total collapse of transport and the millions of unemployed, homeless, invalids and orphans. Such was the reference point of its activity which fell to the lot of Soviet power.

As far as the United States was concerned, it had moved into the leading positions in the world economy even prior to WWI. Its results sharply intensified the detach- ment of the United States from the other imperialist countries inasmuch as they had created to a large extent a nutrient medium for a buildup of the unique compet- itiveness of American products. The “open doors” doc- trine was adopted. Claims to world hegemony intensi- fied. However, following the Versailles peace, an Americano-centrist structure in the camp of imperialism did not emerge. Although they had sustained huge eco- nomic and human losses in the war, Britain and France nonetheless preserved considerable political influence on the course of international affairs. They held on to and in places increased even their colonial possessions and “economic territories.”

Imperialist Japan, which was advancing its claims in China and actively penetrating other regions of ‘he Pacific, was gaining ever increasing strength. Wilson's plan for a “new political order” was turned down by the United States’ partners, and the “open doors” doctrine did not become a component of the Versailles system. The attempts to secure by political methods the expan- sion of American capital in the colonial empires and, in the sphere of global policy, to convert the League of Nations into an instrument of 4 merican world leader- ship (its decision-making procedure afforded the Euro- pean countries obvious advantages) proved unsuccessful also.

The actual unreadiness of the United States for the role of political and, even more, military leader of the capi- talist world was also expressed in the fact that militarily it was at that time weaker than its rivals (this applied both to the composition of the armed forces and the experience of their operational use). Lacking a network of overseas military bases and stro=g points, the United States was unable to create either a desired global or regional infrastructure in Europe, Asia and Africa. All the accessories of political influence were held, as before, by the victorious European countries and also, albeit to a lesser extent, Japan.

The defeat of President W. Wilson at Versailles was not compensated by the results of the Washington confer- ence (1921-1922). The isolationist wing of the American ruling clique preferred not to tie its hands with commit. ments concerning joint actions with European countries but to retain traditional leadership in Latin America. It discerned in the creation of the League of Nations a trend toward a strengthening of the European powers’ influence on world politics and a threat to the “Monroe Doctrine.”

An exception to this isolationist line was U.S. ruling circles’ reaction to the revolution in Russia. It was distinguished by extreme aggressiveness and allowed here of any forms of joint action with European states, including intervention against the young Soviet republic. U.S. ruling circles began to display particular hostility toward the new Russia with the assump’ ‘on of office in 1921 of the Republican Party. They made their contri- bution to the suppression of revolution in a number of European countries also.

Following the end of the civil war in Russia the U.S. Government thwarted all opportunities for the establish- ment of diplomatic relations therewith. In 1923 Secre- tary of State C. Hughes demanded that the USSR (as a “fee” for the possibility of the establishment of such relations) abandon the principal components of its for- eign policy course and fundamental tenets pertaining to the building of socialism even. Hughes’ unconcealed anti-Sovietism was subsequently inherited by F. Kellogg, who replaced him in this office in 1925. An extremely hard line in respect of the USSR, which could, as practice showed, have undergone a certain revision only

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as a result of a strengthening of the economic and defense positions of the USSR, as, equally, its own failures in the economy or policy, had taken shape at that time.

The successes in the Soviet Union's economic develop- ment on the frontier of the 1920s and 1930s together with the crisis state of the U.S. economy in 1929-1933 compelled American business to embark on the develop- ment of business relations with the USSR (while preserv- ing a negative attitude toward the question of political recognition). A period of so-called “trade without recog- nition” ensued.

The significance of the 1930s in the history of Soviet- American relations is extraordinarily great and amounts to more than just the fact of the establishment in 1933 of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was at that time that the most realistic idea of one another appeared and false and at times caricatured stereotypes came to be replaced by images more in keeping with reality. The world political context in which these rela- tions developed had a positive impact on them. The formation of centers of aggression in Europe and Japan was even then “spotlighting” those who were to be on the other side of the barricades and to defend civilization against the new barbarism. The gradual consolidation of the forces opposed to aggression, which had been dic- tated by objective necessity, stimulated Soviet-American mutual attraction (despite the certain loss of trust in the USSR as a consequence of flagrant mistakes and viola- tions of socialist legality perpetrated in the period of coliectivization and in subsequent years). The develop- ment of Soviet-American relations in the 1930s prepared the ground to a certain extent for the subsequent alliance in the fight against fascism.

Hitler Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union initiated Soviet-American cooperation in WWII. Following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States became an actual participant in the anti-Hitler coalition also. In the course of the war the cooperation of the USSR, the United Staics and also Britain passed the tests, despite the numerous attempts on the part of our coalition partners to abandon the concerted line and insist on the safeguarding of unilateral American or British interests. The relations and joint operations of the USSR and the United States were a stabilizing and consolidating link in the alliance. This applied both to the coordination of military operations and the solution of questions of the postwar arrangement of the world. Undoubtedly, the policy of cooperation with the USSR was secured to a considerable extent both by F.D. Roosevelt personally and a number of figures of his administration. At the same time there remained in the United States forces operating from rigid class positions and endeavoring to break up the propitious trend in relations between the USSR and the United States. They were personified by Vice President H. Truman. Unfor- tunately, fierce opponents of Soviet-American coopera- tion headed by him assumed office in the United States after the death of Roosevelt.

Following WWII, in which the USSR and the United States had been allies, there ensued almost without a pause the “cold war,” which marked a long period of Soviet-American confrontation. Following the comple- tion of the rout of fascist Germany and militarist Japan, the narrowness of the joint basis for political cooperation was revealed. The conversion of the Soviet Union into a real force and serious r’ ‘al on the international scene led to a decisive demarcation, which had been held up for some time merely by the inertia of the community of strategic goal in WWII. Among other objective causes of the abrupt deterioration in Soviet-American relations we may cite the factor of the time necessary for recognition of the consequences and realities of the nuclear age and the mutual inertia of evolved military-political concepts and doctrines (the proposition concerning the inevitabil- ity of a military confrontation between capitalism and socialism and ideas concerning the possibility of a war being fought with nuclear weapons and of unilateral military advantages being derived, the inevitability of revolutionary consequences of a new world war by analogy with the results of world wars I and II and so forth). A negative role was also undoubtedly performed by subjective circumstances (the views, for example, of actual leading figures and the distorted interpretation of the actions of the other side).

From the height of the present day it would seem that, for our part, the interweaving of objective and subjective factors was manifested in a deepening of the gulf between the philosophy of the Decree on Peace and the philosophy of the Brest peace. As distinct from the United States, the Soviet Union was, of course, prepared to continue cooperation in the postwar period also. But the concept of such cooperation which we put forward had been frustrated in the past, in the 1930s, and did not prompt Washington to renounce its policy of hardline confrontation.

In the prewar period the United States’ interest in cooperation with us was assured, first, oy the benefits which trade with the USSR afforded the American economy and, second, the aspiration to maintain a certain correlation of forces in Europe and Asia. Cardi- nal changes which required serious theoretical compre- hension and adequate reflection in practical policy occurred in the world. The line of the divide on the Eurasian continent unambiguously ran between states belonging to the two contending systems. We conceived of Soviet-American trade and economic relations as a factor which was to work for the further strengthening of our power. The changes which had occurred in ‘he international situation were seen through the prism of the victory over fascism, which had stimulated, inter alia, the disintegration of the colonial empires and the establishment of a military balance which was propitious for us. They were simplistically perceived as proof of that radical transformation of the correlation of forces which allegedly endow i us with unprecedented oppor- tunities. The increased confidence in ourselves was

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affirmed in the idea that the philosophy of the Brest peace was temporary and emanated solely from our weaknesses at that time and that it was now over.

Truly, the time of compromises which emanated from our weakness had irreversibly sunk into oblivion (the last tribute to this policy was the 1939 Soviet-German non- aggression pact). However, the status acquired by the Soviet Union of great power, on which this solution or the other of the problem of war and peace depends to a large extent, posed the question of determination of the order of priority of our principles and tasks in the international field even more acutely, perhaps, than in the post-revolution period. The “cold war” was probably inevitable. At the same time it could have assumed somewhat alleviated forms hd the sides not been guide J solely by the “tug-of-war” concept constantly leading to stalemate.

The confrontation of the “cold war” era became the engine of the race both in nuclear and conventional arms, which led to both sides squandering tremendous resources. In the United States the strategy and policy of confrontation became enshrined institutionally in the creation and rapid growth of the military-industrial complex, which be.ame a most important component of the domestic political and economic structure. Mutual st~reotypes of social and political thinking which became fer many years a barrier in the way of any constructive eff-~s in the sphere of Soviet-American relations took root. Devotion to these stereotypes led to the creation of numerous crisis situations, from the Korean events yp the West Berlin and Caribbean crises in 1961 and 1962.

At the end of the 1950s and in the 1960: Soviet- American relations began to slowly emerge from the state of political suspended animation. The main impe- tus to the process was imparted by the new foreign policy approaches of the USSR formulated at the 20th CPSU Congress. Many of the cliches which had become firmly established in the past were radically revised, and certain propositions which had impeded the formulation of a constructive USSR policy in the international arena were cast aside.

The reinterpretation of the proposition concerning the inevitability of wars between socialism and capitalism imparted dynamism to Soviet policy. The realities of the nuclear era came to be recognized increasingly well both in Moscow and in Washington. The Eisenhower-Dulles hard line in respect of the USSR and other socialist countries not only had not produced results but had given rise to growing criticism of the United States in West Europe. The Suez crisis and the revolution on Cuba, the defeat of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the events in Lebanon, the launches of the first Soviet space satellites, the crisis in relations between the

United States and Latin America following the Ameri- can intervention in Guatemala—all this ultimately led to certain changes in U.S. policy on a number of interna- tional problems.

The resumption in 1959 of the Geneva conferences of foreign ministers of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France on the German question and the conclusion the same year of the Antarctic Treaty marked a certain stabilization in Soviet-American relations, which was developed in the diplomacy of the J. Kennedy adminis- tration. Having begun with an exacerbation of relations and having come through the lessons of the Bay of Pigs and the Caribbean crisis, the American leadership of that time was forced to recognize the impossibility of nuclear war, the presence for the USSR and the United States of a number of concurrent interests and the need for an end to the “cold war’. A consequence of such changes was, inter alia, the Moscow treaty (1963) banning nuclear tests in three media.

The Soviet Union's achievement of parity with the United States in strategic arms (which created a qualita- tively new basis for Soviet-American relations) and the military defeat of American imperialism in Vietnam together with the weakening of the United States’ world economic positions forced the American leadership to begin a reconsideration of policy both in respect of the Soviet Union and in terms of other problems. It should be noted that the new situation for the United States was evaluated correctly, in the main, by the American lead- ership, which ended the aggression in Vietnam, recog- nizing its failure, and agreed with the need to limit the arms race and accede to a number of other positive steps in the foreign policy sphere.

A period of detente began which completed the first cycle of postwar Soviet-American relations, which had passed through the “cold war” phase and the transitional Stage toward a more stable and positive model. The policy of military-power pressure, which had found itself appreciably undermined, had come to be replaced by the method of negotiations. Albeit not without hesitation, the United States acknowledged for itself the role of a party taking part in such negotiations and not presiding at them.

The detente years were marked by big achievements in the Soviet-American SALT talks and preparations for the solution of a considerable number of global problems and a sharp enhancement of the roie of multilateral diplomacy. Relations between the United States and the USSR proceeded along the path of assuring greater security for themselves and their partners, economies in or the streamlining of national resources used for mili- tary purposes and the development of bilateral contacts on a broad range of issues. But the main result of detente was a ceriain departure from confrontation toward peaceful coexistence. An important feature of this period was the United States’ willingness to agree to appreciable steps forward for the purpose of lowering tension and

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creating stable relations with the USSR. The United States by no means conceived of their development on the basis of the principles of equality and partnership here. Its idea of “participation in detente” incorporated such components as limitation of the quantitative growth of the strategic arms of the USSR (intending the subsequent switch of its efforts to a race in qualitative aspects of the arms), the weakening or, at least, stabili- zation of the USSR’s influence in the developing world and the ideological “softening” of the socialist commu- nity countries.

Of course, the Soviet Union had no intention of abiding by the rules of the game which had been proposed by Washington. Having achieved strategic parity with the United States, it displayed a persistent endeavor to hold On to it in the future also. The Soviet Union was not, of course, a detached observer of events which had occurred in the developing countries, although the events in Angola had proven a severe test for the United States’ preservation of a positive attitude toward detente. Finally, advancement of the proposition con- cerning the exacerbation of the ideological struggle was perceived in Washington as evidence that in this field also its intention had no serious chance of coming to fruition. On the other hand, the incapacity of the United States for realizing its intentions was evaluated in the USSR as natural consequence of the changes in the correlation of forces in favor of the forces of peace and progress, this being seen as proof of the soundness of the policy of detente and a guarantee of its irreversibility.

At the same time the utter unattainability of all the goals which the United States had set itself, having joined in the detente process, which had been confirmed con- stantly in practice, reduced to nothing its interest in a continuation of this process. This fact was not properly taken into consideration in our policy. And once again the failure to observe the correct relationship between the philosophy of the Decree on Peace and the philoso- phy of the Brest peace “did its work” —contributed on this occasion to the fading of detente.

I would like to emphasize that the question of the correlation between the actual content of detente and the limits within which the Soviet Union was prepared to make its contribution, based on compromise, to this content became particularly acute in the 1970s. This question has become even more pertinent now. After all, it is now that we are beginning to provide it with appropriate answers. For example, the ideas concerning the correlation between detente and the ideological struggle based on the proposition concerning the exacer- bation of the ideological struggle and the “intensification of the ideological confrontation of the two systems” led under the specific conditions of the 1970s to a lack of readiness on our part to approach so-called humanitar- ian problems in a new way. In addition, in the interpre- tation of the proposition concerning the exacerbation of the ideological struggle a certain distortion in the direc- tion of portrayal of this process as occurring at the

propaganda, “psychological warfare” level arose. Yet in the atmosphere of detente it reflected in more undis- guised form the historical argument about which system is the more efficient from the economic, social and political viewpoints.

Or, another example. There was a scholastic approach to the “third world” as an unbroken “zone of the augmen- tation of socialism” and as a natural ally in all instances in the struggle against imperialism (without regard for the differentiation factor), which resulted in us being pulled into regional conflicts. Angola was followed by events in the Horn of Africa, then, in Afghanistan. As a result there was a sharp intensification of Soviet-Amer- ican rivalry and a polarization of the two powers’ posi- tions on the question of that in which mutually accept- able solutions ought to be sought and, evidently, found.

Finally, a whole number of legal doctrines pertaining to the international sphere which had taken shape in our country failed to link up with the trend which had appeared by the mid-1970s toward international-law assurances for this question or the other. Thus the objective demand for the transfer to certain interna- tional organizations of the functions of obligatory regu- lation of certain types of states’ activity came into conflict with the doctrine which had been elaborated in our country in prewar years even denying international organizations this right as a violation in all cases without exception of a state’s sovereignty. This led to the point of us simultaneously denying, while putting forward urgent and objectively necessary disarmament proposals, the right to effective mutual supervision of the realization of disarmament measures. The concepts of the monitoring of implementation and responsibility for violation (impairment and so forth) of the mutual forwarding of reliable information were particularly “unlucky”. Yet problems of international law, which arose in a tremen- dous number in the 1970s, constituted an important part of the overall political context in which the detente process developed. Ensuring the steady preservation and expansion of this context meant securing a basic condi- tion of detente and the peaceful coexistence and cooper- ation of states. And it cannot be precluded that in the 1970s and later also the United States made direct use in its policy of knowledge of our stereotypes and the confidence that they would “work” in any event. The United States’ present maneuvers on verification issues, after we have proposed radical steps in this field, attest the soundness of such a supposition.

The detente period was brief. An exacerbation in Sovict- American relations began in the mid-1970s, and in the first haif of the 1980s there came to be talk of a “second cold war’. A new cycle characterized by a higher level of the costs of confrontation, on the military, political and diplomatic “servicing” of which resources of unprece- dented scale came to be spent, began. For the first time the permanent (and not crisis) threat of global nuclear

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catastrophe appeared. A whole set of regional conflicts, in which the symmetrical interests of the two great powers were involved, arose.

The transition to the said cy ie was brought about by a number of factors. The strengthening of conservative forces in the United States, which began in the latter half of the 1970s and which brought to office at the 1980 elections the Reagan administration, did not simply accompany but supported this process. The combination of the positions of the new right, the traditional Repub- lican right and rightwing democrats and their seizure at the start of the 1930's of power both in Congress and in the White House led to important changes in the foreign policy course of the United States as a whole and in its policy in respect of the USSR. Whereas the factors which had contributed to the “departure” of detente from international relations had been created, albeit not to an equal extent, by all parties, the return to confrontation was realized solely by the United States, which bears the political and historical responsibility for this.

At the end of the 1970s U.S. ruling circles recognized for the first time their superiority upon a comparison of the dynamics of the economic development of their country and the Soviet Union. The stagnant phenomena in the Soviet economy and social development, which had led by the mid-1980’s to the appearance of economic con- tradictions which were of precrisis form, interrupted the almost 50-year trend of the increasing preferential (com- pared with the United States) rate of development of the Soviet economy.

These events were perceived in the United States as a signal for adding the burden, “critical,” they believed, for undermining the Soviet economy, of 2 new spiral of military spending. U.S. policy in respect of the USSR at the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s was composed of efforts to curb Soviet exports, prevent imports into the USSR of products with a high and medium level of science-intensiveness and undermine all forms of the USSR’s economic cooperation with the developed capitalist and developing countries. Essen- tially the United States intended the economic isolation of the USSR. In sharply in*ensifying regional conflicts and throwing hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars into them the United States thereby attempted to impose on the Soviet Union also the burdens of addi- tional spending in these regions.

Such facts as the renunciation of disarmament negotia- tions and refusal to ratify agreements which had already been achieved and an attempt to revise them; the revival of doctrines aimed at the achievement of military supe- riority and the adoption of “acceptable damage,” “limited” nuclear war and possible victory in a nuclear confrontation concepts; the sharp increase in the muiii- tary budget; unbridled “‘psychological warfare” against the USSR and other socialist countries; direct interven- tionist actions on Grenada and in Libya and Lebanon

also testified to the Reagan administration's intention of changing to its benefit the evolved correlation of forces between the USSR and the United States.

The United States’ policy in respect of the USSR became an element of its policy of global revanche and a part of attempts to restore its positions in the world, in respect of the developing countries, West Europe and Japan included. Whereas in the mid-1970s American diplo- macy had displayed a readiness to accede to certain compromises in the “North-South” dialogue, as fears concerning a raw material shortage disappeared, this readiness weakened and ultimately yielded to a policy of a stringent reconsideration of American positions in respect of the entire set of problems of this dialogue.

At the same time, however, in connection with the fact that the growth rate of the American economy proved somewhat higher than the West European rate and matched the Japanese rate almost there arose in the United States the illusion of stabilization and the possi- bility of a return of lost positions in the world economy. This was precisely an illusion inasmuch as the American evaluations were based on the passe philosophy of an uncoupled and constantly uncoupling world community wherein struggle to assert se!fish separate interests 1s the law.

This was an illusion also because in reality a decline in the growth rate in a competing country or group of countries does not now inevitably lead to a change in the relative position of the pcwer centers in the world capitalist economy. It is not only and not so much this rate which determines the true correlation of forces between the centers. In the era of the S&T revolution a constant improvement in the quality and efficiency of the consumed product is coming to replace quantitative growth of the amount of personal and industrial con- sumption. Therefore of far more importance for assess- ing the actual place of the United States in the world economy are such factors as the rapid decline in its share of the world trade in science-intensive products, the deficit balance in the foreign trade in these products which occurred for the first time in 1986, the growing imports of producer goods and the increasing proportion of consumption of foreign products in the physical support of capital investments in American industry, transport and communications. The unprecedented combination of the growth of imports and the decline in the exchange rate of the dollar has intensified sharply the problem of the competitiveness of American commodi- ties on both the foreign and domestic markets. The conversion of the United States into a debtor is also a new phenomenon.

The deterioration in the economic position of the devel- oping countries has also had a negative effect on the world positions of the United States. Backwardness is inevitably leading to social and political instability, creating dangerous centers of conflicts which are assum- ing an international nature and pulling into their orbit

JPRS-UWE-88-007 17 June 1988

states located outside of the conflict region. Backward- ness-instability-conflicts-militarization-international tension-a slowing of development—such is the logical pattern of processes whose source is the poverty of the peoples. The accumulation of huge debts is lessening the guarantees that they will be paid off and undermining the stability of the world currency and credit system and could lead to unpredictable political decisions